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ARTICLE
Cleaning Up Our Toxic Coasts:
A Precautionary and Human Health-Based
Approach to Coastal Adaptation
ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG*
Hurricanes in the United States in 2005, 2012, and 2017 have
all revealed an insidious problem for coastal climate change
adaptation: toxic contamination in the coastal zone. As sea levels
rise and violent coastal storms become increasingly frequent, this
legacy of toxic pollution threatens immediate emergency response,
longer term human health, and coastal ecosystems’ capacity to
adapt to changing coastal conditions.
Focusing on Hurricane Harvey’s 2017 devastation of Houston,
Texas, as its primary example, this Article first discusses the toxic
legacy still present in many coastal environments. It then examines
the existing laws available to clean up the coastal zone—CERCLA,
RCRA, and the Coastal Zone Management Act at the federal level,
land use planning, and state tort law—both to identify ways in
which states and the federal government could more effectively
implement existing law and to suggest improvements to these
existing laws to more emphatically prioritize the elimination of
toxic coastal legacies. It concludes with three specific
recommendations that precautionarily prioritize human health
considerations in coastal management as a means of reducing
coastal toxicity in the Anthropocene.

*
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INTRODUCTION

When Hurricane Harvey, a Category 4 hurricane, made
landfall on the central Texas coast, just north of Corpus Christi, on
August 25, 2017, 1 it demonstrated both the power and the danger
of coastal storms in ways that should be relevant for U.S. coastal
policy throughout the 21st century. First, Harvey was huge and
repeatedly battered the Gulf Coast. At its first landfall, the
hurricane was 280 miles in diameter and had 130 mile-per-hour
winds.2 It moved north to Houston the next day, remained there
for four days, then made landfall, a third time, on August 29, at
Port Arthur and Beaumont, Texas, near the Louisiana border. 3
While Hurricane Harvey concentrated its force on Texas and
Louisiana, “[i]t affected 13 million people from Texas through
Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Kentucky.”4 The storm
killed 88 people 5 and left thousands more homeless. 6
Second, Hurricane Harvey brought record-breaking rainfall—
and subsequent unprecedented flooding—to the Gulf Coast.7 As
noted, the hurricane stalled out over Houston, dropping two feet of
rain in the first 24 hours and 40 inches over 48 hours. 8 Two
reservoirs overflowed.9 When the hurricane made landfall for the
third time, “[i]t dumped 26 inches of rain in 24 hours” at the
Louisiana border,10 then rained an additional 10 inches on
Nashville, Tennessee, on September 1. 11 In an attempt to describe
1. Kimberly Amadeo, Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs, THE
BALANCE (Aug. 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/74LQ-9JHL.
2. Id.; Hurricane Harvey Aftermath: What Happened and What’s Next, CNN,
https://perma.cc/KF95-T6CL [hereinafter Hurricane Harvey Aftermath].
3. Amadeo, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Robin Kundis Craig, Harvey, Irma, and the NFIP: Did the 2017
Hurricane Season Matter to Flood Insurance Reauthorization?, 40.3 UNIV. OF ARK.
AT LITTLE ROCK L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) for a more comprehensive discussion
of Hurricane Harvey’s flooding and its potential implications for reauthorization
of the National Flood Insurance Program.
8. Id.; cf. Amadeo, supra note 1 (“In comparison, Hurricane Katrina dropped
5-20 inches of rain in just 48 hours. Most of its flooding came from storm surges
that overwhelmed the levee system.”).
9. Amadeo, supra note 1.
10. Id.; Hurricane Harvey Aftermath, supra note 2.
11. Amadeo, supra note 1.
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the scale of the rainfall, a Washington Post reporter noted that “[a]t
least 20 inches of rain fell over an area (nearly 29,000 square miles)
larger than 10 states, including West Virginia and Maryland (by a
factor of more than two)” and “[a]t least 30 inches of rain fell over
an area (more than 11,000 square miles) equivalent to Maryland’s
size.”12 At the storm’s peak on September 1, one-third of Houston
was underwater,13 and “[t]otal rainfall hit 51.88 inches in Cedar
Bayou on the outskirts of Houston. That’s a record for a single
storm in the continental United States.” 14
Third, Harvey may be the first hurricane for which scientists
agree that climate change made a significant contribution to the
storm’s severity.15 While scientists still will not assert that climate
change “causes” any particular coastal storm, in December 2017,
two research groups concluded that Harvey’s record rainfall “was
as much as 38 percent higher than would be expected in a world
that was not warming.”16 Warmer-than-normal air and ocean
water temperatures, sea levels that are six inches higher than 20
years ago, and climate change-affected weather patterns that
promote storm stalling may all have contributed to Harvey’s
record-breaking precipitation.17 In addition, both studies “found
that climate change roughly tripled the odds of a Harvey-type

12. Jason Samenow, Harvey is a 1000-year Flood Event Unprecedented in
Scale, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/4G3B-2EG2.
13. Amadeo, supra note 1.
14. Id.; see also Hurricane Harvey Aftermath, supra note 2.
15. Amadeo, supra note 1; see also Geert Jan van Oldenborgh et al.,
Attribution of Extreme Rainfall From Hurricane Harvey, August 2017, 12 ENVTL.
RES. LETTERS 124009, 10 (2017); Mark D. Risser & Michael F. Wehner,
Attributable Human-Induced Changes in the Likelihood and Magnitude of the
Observed Extreme Precipitation during Hurricane Harvey, 44 GEOPHYSICAL RES.
LETTERS 12,457, 12,463 (2017); Henry Fountain, Scientists Link Hurricane
Harvey’s Record Rainfall to Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2017),
https://perma.cc/8D42-UHKV.
16. Fountain, supra note 15; accord Michael Greshko, Climate Change Likely
Supercharged Hurricane Harvey, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Dec. 13, 2017),
https://perma.cc/Y5EP-YMCR (reporting the same 38 percent high). See also
Oldenborgh et al., supra note 15, at 124009 (reporting 15 percent as most
probable); Risser & Wehner, supra note 15, at 12,463 (reporting 18 to 19 percent
as most probable).
17. Amadeo, supra note 1; see also German Lopez, How Global Warming
Likely Made Harvey Much Worse, Explained By a Climatologist, VOX (Aug. 28,
2017), https://perma.cc/K65Z-QQ8X.
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storm.”18 Thus, as climate scientists have long predicted,19 it
appears that climate change is already increasing the likelihood of
more severe hurricanes.
Finally, and of particular relevance to this Article, Hurricane
Harvey demonstrated, in immediately comprehensible ways, the
latent toxicity of the United States’ coasts. For example, among
other issues, “Harvey flooded 800 wastewater treatment facilities
and 13 Superfund sites . . . spread[ing] sewage and toxic chemicals
into the flooded areas.” 20 As will be discussed in more detail in Part
II, Harvey, and to a lesser extent Hurricane Irma, caused
significant toxic pollutant loading in the communities they
affected, particularly Houston. Given the prediction of growing
numbers of increasingly severe coastal storms throughout the 21st
century,21 Harvey and Irma make compelling cases for a more
precautionary and health-based approach to coastal management
that prioritizes: (1) cleaning up current coastal contamination; (2)
retrofitting existing coastal facilities that handle hazardous and
toxic materials to prevent further coastal contamination; and (3)
limiting the siting of additional such facilities in the coastal zone
in the future.
This Article explores the toxic risks along the United States’
coasts, particularly in light of the increasing threat from coastal
storms. It begins in Part II by providing an overview of existing
contamination in the United States coastal zones, focusing on the
damage that Hurricane Harvey caused in its interactions with
Houston’s many hazardous waste sites and toxics-handling
facilities. Part III then reviews existing legal authorities for
dealing with coastal toxicity in both federal and state
environmental and tort law. Part IV offers suggestions for a more
precautionary and health-based approach to coastal toxicity,
emphasizing both cleanup of existing problems and more toxicitysensitive engagement in coastal land use planning and building
codes. The Article concludes that there is much that federal,

18. Greshko, supra note 16; see also Oldenborgh et al., supra note 15, at 1.
19. E.g., IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT 53 (2014)
(discussing the fact that cimate change is likely to make coastal storms more
intense), available at https://perma.cc/PMB6-7WGA [hereinafter 2014 IPCC
SYNTHESIS REPORT].
20. Amadeo, supra note 1.
21. 2014 IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 19, at 53.
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coastal-state, and local governments could do to reduce toxicity
exposure along the coasts during coastal storms, emphasizing that
these measures also make considerable sense as climate change
adaptation strategies.
II.

THE UNITED STATES’ TOXIC COASTS

A. An Overview of Coastal Toxicity in the United
States
The United States is a coastal nation. As of 2010, over half of
the U.S. population (excluding Alaska) “lived in one of the nation’s
673 coastal counties.”22 “Between 1960 and 2008, the national
coastline population rose by 84 percent, compared with 64 percent
inland, according to the Census Bureau.” 23 Moreover, coastal U.S.
populations continue to grow at a faster pace than inland
populations,24 despite significant hurricane seasons in 2005
(Katrina), 2012 (Sandy), and 2017 (Harvey, Irma, and Maria).
Thus, any risks to coastal populations pose a significant national
problem.
The nation’s coasts receive toxic and hazardous pollution and
exposure from a number of sources. For example, upstream
agricultural and urban runoff carries pesticides, oil, grease, heavy
metals, pathogens, pharmaceuticals, and other contaminants
downstream to coastal communities and ecosystems; 25 mercury
has shown up in California coastal fog banks.26 In addition,
between 1918 and 1970, the Department of Defense disposed of
chemical weapons in the ocean, including sulphur mustard and

22. NAT’L OCEAN SERVICE, COASTAL HAZARDS: PREPARING FOR THE THREATS
FACE OUR COASTAL COMMUNITIES, https://perma.cc/ZNN7-3YAB; see also
Sarah G. McCarthy et al., Coastal Storms, Toxic Runoff, and the Sustainable
Conservation of Fish and Fisheries, 64 AM. FISHERIES SOC’Y SYMP. 1, 2 (2008),
https://perma.cc/QJ3Y-8UA (noting that this land area represents only 17 percent
of the United States).
23. Jeff Donn, U.S. Coastal Population Continues to Grow Despite Lessons of
Past Storms, THE DENVER POST (Sept. 16, 2017), https://perma.cc/U64U-T2DD.
24. Id.
25. Id.; see also National Institutes of Health, U.S. Medical Library:
ToxTown: Runoff, https://perma.cc/H8JX-6S7Y.
26. Alison Hawkes, Toxic Fog? Mercury Showing Up in Coastal California
Fog Banks, KQED SCI. (Dec. 18, 2015), https://perma.cc/W7PT-BWCE.
THAT
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chemical nerve agents, along all three U.S. coasts. 27 However, the
Department concluded in a 2016 report to Congress that these
wastes do not pose a significant threat to human health or the
environment and that removal is not warranted. 28 Facilities
emitting air pollutants, including power plants and waste
incinerators, can also be sources of coastal toxic exposure.29
The underappreciated but far more worrisome sources of
coastal toxics with respect to hurricanes and sea-level rise,
however, are land-based contaminated sites—landfills, illegal
hazardous waste disposal sites, and legacy toxic waste dumps—
and ongoing facilities that handle toxic and hazardous substances.
Assembling some sense of how significant a risk these sites pose,
however, requires much digging through multiple sources. At the
federal level, for instance, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) tracks hazardous disposal sites through the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (“CERCLA,” often referred to as Superfund).30 Just a
glance at the EPA’s map31 of sites listed on the National Priorities
List (“NPL”)32 indicates that many coastal cities contain significant
concentrations of these highly-toxic Superfund sites, especially
Seattle, Washington; San Francisco, California; Los Angeles,
California; Houston, Texas; Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Pensacola,
Florida; Tampa/St. Petersburg, Florida; Jacksonville, Florida;
Wilmington, North Carolina; and essentially the entire Atlantic
coast from Norfolk, Virginia, north to Portland, Maine.

27. DAVID M. BEARDEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33432, U.S. DISPOSAL OF
CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE OCEAN: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2
(2007), https://perma.cc/W6KQ-83CU.
28. U.S. DEP’T. OF DEF., RESEARCH RELATED TO EFFECT OF OCEAN DISPOSAL OF
MUNITIONS IN U.S. COASTAL WATERS: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (2016),
https://perma.cc/34WB-PCJK .
29. See, e.g., TOXICS ACTION CENTER, TOXICS IN MASSACHUSETTS: A TOWN-BYTOWN PROFILE 12-16 (2010) [hereinafter
Toxics
Action Center],
https://perma.cc/HJX3-LAF5 (discussing air pollution as a toxicity problem in
Massachusetts and providing maps of power plants and waste incineration
facilities that show where these sources are located along the coast).
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (West 2018).
31. Superfund National Priorities List Map, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://perma.cc/6LVT-2N5Y [hereinafter Superfund Map]; see also Cleanups in
My Community Map, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://perma.cc/X4U6-7Q92
[hereinafter My Community Map].
32. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(c)(1); Superfund Map, supra note 31.
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The EPA regulates ongoing industrial facilities that could pose
hazardous or toxic waste problems through the federal Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”).33 Releases at hazardous
waste treatment, storage, and disposal (“TSD”) facilities require
corrective actions—that is, cleanups.34 While the EPA does not
keep cleanup statistics in terms of inland versus coastal
communities, its “Cleanups in My Community” map indicates that
RCRA corrective action sites are approximately as prevalent as
NPL sites, roughly doubling the federally-actionable contaminated
toxic sites along the U.S. coasts.35
State-specific information can also help to flesh out our
understanding of the latent toxicity of the nation’s coasts. In
Massachusetts, for example, RCRA large-quantity hazardous
waste generators, CERCLA NPL sites, and state-designated Tier 1
hazardous waste sites are concentrated along the coast. 36 Together
with landfills, power plants, and incinerators, these sites produce
a rather pronounced coastal toxic load, especially around Boston. 37
As the Toxics Action Center has summarized:
Massachusetts has thousands of potential and identified
hazardous waste sites awaiting cleanup, some of the worst air
quality in the nation, and rivers and lakes polluted by
industrial contaminants and toxic mercury. Asthma and
cancer rates are some of the highest in the country, and both
can be linked to environmental causes. Massachusetts is also
plagued by economic disparities. Poor urban areas are often the
most overburdened by toxic pollution.38

Although characterization of the toxic burden and risks facing
citizens living on the United States’ coasts remains incomplete,
scientists, as well as federal and state agencies, have compiled
enough data to suggest that coastal residents should be concerned.
For example, between 1991 and 1997, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”) analyzed 1,543 surface
sediment samples from 25 estuaries and marine bays—i.e., the
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k.
Id. §§ 6924(u), (v).
My Community Map, supra note 31.
See TOXICS ACTION CENTER, supra note 29, at 11, 19, 21 (providing maps).
See id. at 26 (showing the cumulative concentration of toxic facilities).
Id. at 4.
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sediments closest to shore—from all three U.S. coasts (Gulf,
Atlantic, and Pacific), concluding that about 6 percent of the coast
was toxic; the EPA’s parallel study calculated that 7 percent of the
coast was toxic.39 However, tests based on sub-lethal effects on
marine organisms suggested a much broader problem, with 25 to
39 percent of the U.S. coasts returning toxic results.40
Another indicator for concern comes from the EPA’s semiregular National Coastal Condition Reports, which contain
summaries of fish tissue contamination by region, providing
another indicator of coastal toxic exposure. 41 Specifically, the fish
tissue assessment looks at the concentration of various toxics—
arsenic, cadmium, mercury, selenium, chlordane, DDT, dieldrin,
endosulfan, endrin, heptachlor epoxide, hexachlorobenzene,
lindane, mirex, toxaphene, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons
(“PAHs”), and polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”)—in fish, and
assesses coastal conditions based on risks to human health
through fish consumption.42 In the latest National Coastal
Condition Report from 2012, 13 percent of U.S. coasts, overall,
were in poor condition for fish tissue contamination, but regions
ranged from zero percent in poor condition (southeastern Alaska
and Guam) to 20 percent in poor condition along the northeast
coast (although, notably, the calculations did not include the area
of the Gulf of Mexico’s dead zone).43 Another 13 percent of U.S.
coasts, overall, were in fair condition,44 indicating that, in total,
over one-quarter of the nation’s coasts face some risk from toxicity.
The EPA further noted that areas “in poor and fair condition were
dominated by samples with elevated concentrations of total PCBs,
total DDT, total PAHs, and mercury.”45
The National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) has compiled data
from the EPA’s Superfund database for CERCLA and its Toxic
Release Inventory (“TRI”) database for the federal Emergency
39. Edward R. Long, Spatial Extent of Sediment Toxicity in U.S. Estuaries
and Marine Bays, in MONITORING ECOLOGICAL CONDITION IN THE WESTERN UNITED
STATES 391, 391, 403-05 (2000).
40. Id.
41. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL COASTAL CONDITION REPORT IV
(2012), https://perma.cc/YVM3-7RZ3.
42. Id. at 25.
43. Id. at tbl. ES-2.
44. Id. at fig. 2-10.
45. Id. at 49.
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Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (“EPCRA”),46 as well
as several other sources of information from both the federal
government and Canada,47 to create TOXMAP,48 a map of releases
of specific toxic chemicals across the United States. Designed
originally to facilitate emergency response,49 EPCRA requires all
U.S. facilities releasing listed toxic and hazardous substances at or
above reportable thresholds to report those releases, 50 which the
EPA then complies into the TRI database. 51 TOXMAP makes clear
that larger cities, whether coastal or not, generally endure the
greatest concentrations of toxic releases. Nevertheless, as was true
for the EPA’s “Cleanups in My Community” map, many coastal
areas light up particularly brightly on the NIH’s TOXMAP—
Seattle, San Francisco, and Los Angeles on the Pacific coast;
Houston, New Orleans, and Tampa on the Gulf coast; Milwaukee,
Chicago, and Detroit along the Great Lakes; and almost all of
Florida’s and the northeastern states’ Atlantic coasts. 52
Such compilations and characterizations of “standard”
toxicity, however, do not paint the full picture of coastal toxic risk.
Coastal storms and hurricanes can dramatically increase coastal
communities’ acute and even longer-term toxic exposure.
Moreover, toxic sites and infrastructure along the coast pose longterm concerns in the face of global sea-level rise. Hurricane Harvey
provided a particularly graphic example of how storms can interact
with coastal toxicity to pose significant human health concerns.
B. Hurricane Harvey and Houston, August-September
2017
Hurricanes in the United States dramatically illuminate the
latent toxicity of coastal zone infrastructure and reveal the fact
that invading seawater threatens both unusually high emissions
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050 (West 2018).
47. TOXMAP Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
https://perma.cc/Y3E7-SXPZ.
48. TOXMAP Home Page, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
https://perma.cc/XUQ7-RUXJ.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 11003(a).
50. Id. §§ 11002, 11023.
51. Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) Program, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://perma.cc/P3RD-AX7W.
52. TOXMAP Home Page, supra note 48.
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of hazardous air pollutants and a toxic soup of sewage, oil, and
hazardous chemicals from coastal businesses (such as dry cleaners
and auto repair facilities), industrial sites, Superfund sites, and
toxic waste facilities.53 While the full threat of dissolved and
mixing toxic chemicals has not yet been fully realized as a result of
a major U.S. coastal storm, some have come alarmingly close. For
example, after Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans in
2005, “hazardous substances such as volatile organic compounds
(“VOCs”), lead, and arsenic were detected in the air, soil, and
sediment samples,” and “the potential for a toxic release of
hazardous substances after a storm exist[ed].” 54 Similarly, after
Hurricane Sandy hit “New York and New Jersey in 2012, officials
had to monitor 247 Superfund sites—one of which, the Gowanus
Canal, overflowed into people’s homes.” 55
1. Waste-Related Spills During Hurricane Harvey
Hurricane Harvey’s 2017 flooding of the Houston area—the
United States’ fourth largest city—may produce one of the most
toxic legacies of U.S. hurricanes. To begin, Harvey inundated
thirteen of the Houston area’s forty-one hazardous waste sites,56
and the city contains “several other highly toxic sites managed by

53. Kathryn Lane et al., Health Effects of Coastal Storms and Flooding in
Urban Areas: A Review and Vulnerability Assessment, 2013 J. ENVTL. & PUBLIC
HEALTH 1, 2 (2013); see also Danny D. Reible et al., Toxic and Contaminant
Concerns Generated by Hurricane Katrina, 36 THE BRIDGE 5, 5 (2006),
https://perma.cc/7PD2-LB59.
54. Lane et al., supra note 53, at 5; see also Steven M. Presley et al.,
Assessment of Pathogens and Toxicants in New Orleans, LA Following Hurricane
Katrina, 40 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 468, 468 (2006), https://perma.cc/8PHU-C8AW
(“Concentrations of aldrin, arsenic, lead, and seven semivolatile organic
compounds in sediments/soils exceeded one or more United States Environmental
Protection Agency (USEPA) thresholds for human health soil screening levels and
high priority bright line screening levels.”).
55. Emily Atkin, America Has a Toxic Waste Hurricane Problem, THE NEW
REPUBLIC (Sept. 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/69RK-MG6F; see also Elizabeth A.
Harris, In Brooklyn, Worrying About Not Only Flooding but What’s in the Water,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2012), https://perma.cc/SMK8-PRG8 (reporting on the
Gowanus Canal Superfund site overflow).
56. Atkin, supra note 55; see also Troy Griggs et al., More Than 40 Sites
Released Hazardous Pollutants Because of Hurricane Harvey, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
8, 2017), https://perma.cc/G3K2-TYA9.
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the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality.”57 (Notably, a
few weeks later, Hurricane Irma was even worse in terms of
threatened superfund sites: eighty such sites stood in Hurricane
Irma’s path through Florida). 58 The New York Times described
Harvey’s floodwaters as “a stew of toxic chemicals, sewage, debris
and waste . . . Runoff from the city’s sprawling petroleum and
chemicals complex contains any number of hazardous compounds.
Lead, arsenic and other toxic and carcinogenic elements may be
leaching from some two dozen Superfund sites in the Houston
area.”59
The worst of the inundated waste sites was the San Jacinto
Waste Pits, a “dioxin-laden federal Superfund site whose
protective cap was damaged by the raging San Jacinto River.”60
The highly contaminated waste pits are located “right next to
homes and schools, and that has frightened residents for
decades.”61 The site consists of two waste pits in the middle of the
San Jacinto river, where a paper mill dumped its wastes,
specifically dioxin and furans, during the 1960s. 62 Paper companies
used dioxin to bleach paper white, and the compound is toxic at
parts per quadrillion.63 Temporary concrete caps installed in 2011
were supposed to keep the pits from further contaminating the
river, but Hurricane Harvey caused the river to rip through them,64
releasing contamination.
However, smaller waste spills were also noteworthy. For
example, W&P Development Corp. owns “an industrial park where
about 100,000 gallons of oily wastewater were reported to have
spilled into the San Jacinto from August 29 to August 31. The site
57. Darryl Fears & Brady Dennis, Houston’s Polluted Superfund Sites
Threaten to Contaminate Floodwaters, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2017),
https://perma.cc/3HUH-FGRM.
58. Atkin, supra note 55.
59. Hiroko Tabuchi & Sheila Kaplan, A Sea of Health and Environmental
Hazards in Houston’s Floodwaters, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 31, 2017),
https://perma.cc/UKQ6-V2BK.
60. Hurricane Harvey’s Toxic Impact Deeper Than Public Told, CBS NEWS
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://perma.cc/U77X-S72D [hereinafter Toxic Impact].
61. Rebecca Hersher, EPA Takes Toxic Site Flooded by Harvey Off Special
Cleanup List, NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/86NF-XJ2F.
62. Id.
63. WILLIAM BOYD, THE SLAIN WOOD: PAPERMAKING AND ITS ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSEQUENCES IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 198 (2015) (emphasis added).
64. Hersher, supra note 61.
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was formerly Champion Paper Mill and a landfill there received
wastes including turpentine- and lead-contaminated soil and
mercury until 2008.” 65
Wastewaters also proved to be problematic. “The largest spill,
by far, was at ExxonMobil Corp.’s Olefins Plant in Baytown, east
of the ship channel. Two days after Harvey hit, some 457 million
gallons of stormwater mixed with untreated wastewater, including
oil and grease, surged into an adjacent creek.” 66 Floodwaters also
became contaminated with sewage, and tested floodwater samples
revealed E. coli bacteria concentrations ten to eighty times higher
than the EPA’s recommendations for recreational water quality
(the recommendation for drinking water is zero), although all the
tests for heavy metals revealed concentrations below the EPA’s
levels of concern.67
2. Petroleum-Related Spills in Houston During
Hurricane Harvey
Houston has more sources of toxicity than just waste sites.
“Some 500 chemical plants, 10 refineries and more than 6,670
miles of intertwined oil, gas and chemical pipelines line the
nation’s largest energy corridor.”68 The city is, of course, famous for
its oil industry, including oil refineries. Needless to say, record
flooding and oil refineries don’t mix well. For example, “storage
tanks holding crude oil, gasoline and toxic contaminants failed
when storm water from Harvey caused them to collapse, spilling at
least 145,000 gallons of fuel and polluting the air.” 69 Benzene
contamination of the air proved particularly troubling.
“Preliminary air sampling in the Manchester district of Houston
showed concentrations of up to 324 parts per billion of benzene”—
a concentration “above the level at which federal safety officials
recommend special breathing equipment for workers.”70 In late
August 2017, ExxonMobil acknowledged “that Hurricane Harvey
65. Toxic Impact, supra note 60.
66. Id.
67. Susan Scutti, Sewage, Fecal Bacteria in Hurricane Harvey Floodwaters,
CNN (Sept. 15, 2017), https://perma.cc/33CM-7S8L.
68. Toxic Impact, supra note 60.
69. ECOWATCH, Hurricanes Irma and Harvey Cast Spotlight on Toxic Sites
in Our Midst (Sept. 12, 2017), https://perma.cc/Z9LF-8DSX.
70. Tabuchi, supra note 59.
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damaged two of its refineries, causing the release of hazardous
pollutants”—specifically, high emissions of volatile organic
compounds and over one million pounds of sulfur dioxide,71 both of
which are regulated air pollutants under the Clean Air Act.72
Initial reports from Texas regulators indicate that, because of
Hurricane Harvey, “the region’s massive petrochemical industry
released more than 2 million pounds of harmful pollutants into the
air as of Aug. 29”—“roughly 40 percent of what the entire Houston
region released in 2016 . . . .”73 As of October 2017, the EPA was
still assessing three reported spills at US Oil Recovery, described
by news outlets as “a former petroleum industry waste processing
plant contaminated with a dangerous brew of cancer-causing
chemicals.”74
Numerous other petroleum-related spills also occurred.
Flooding in Panther Creek, for example, caused several releases,
including a “460,000-gallon gasoline spill at a Magellan Midstream
Partners tank farm and nearly 52,000 pounds of crude oil from a
Seaway Crude Pipeline Inc. tank.” 75 Residents of Galena Park, a
mostly Latino neighborhood, were subjected to more than one
dozen releases within a two-mile radius as a result of Harvey,
including a gasoline spill at the Magellan terminal initially
reported at 42,000 gallons but eventually revealed to be ten times
bigger.76 In addition, “[t]he spill ranked as Texas’ largest reported
Harvey-related venting of air pollutants, at 1,143 tons.” 77
3. Chemical Spills in Houston During Hurricane

71. Steven Mufson, ExxonMobil Refineries are Damaged in Hurricane
Harvey, Releasing Hazardous Pollutants, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2017),
https://perma.cc/6CNZ-MTYN.
72. Criteria
Air
Pollutants,
U.S.
ENVTL.
PROT.
AGENCY,
https://perma.cc/77QW-R9UY.
73. Adam Allington, Flooded Houston Facing Air Threat, Too, With Toxic
Gas Releases, BLOOMBERG ENV’T. 1 (2017) (quoting Elena Craft),
https://perma.cc/4W2K-R8VS.
74. Michael Biesecker & Frank Bajak, Hurricane Harvey: Floodwaters
‘Caused Chemical Spill’ at Houston’s Dirtiest Toxic Waste Plant, INDEP. (Sept. 19,
2017), https://perma.cc/4BEP-7Z93.
75. Toxic Impact, supra note 60.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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Harvey
As noted, Houston is also home to, or near, 500 chemical
plants, many of which were flooded. As CBS News reported in
March 2018:
Nearly half a billion gallons of industrial wastewater mixed with
storm water surged out of just one chemical plant in Baytown,
east of Houston on the upper shores of Galveston Bay. Benzene,
vinyl chloride, butadiene and other known human carcinogens
were among the dozens of tons of industrial toxins released into
surrounding neighborhoods and waterways following Harvey’s
torrential rains.78

Some of the chemical releases created acutely dangerous
conditions. For example, on August 28:
[A]n 18-inch pipeline leak at Williams Midstream Services Inc.
unleashed a plume of [hydrogen chloride gas] near the
intersection of two major highways in La Porte, southeast of
Houston, where the San Jacinto River meets the 50-mile ship
channel. It’s the petrochemical corridor’s main artery that
empties into Galveston Bay.79

The resulting toxic cloud of hydrochloric acid spread about onequarter mile through the industrial neighborhood, forcing people
to remain inside lest the vaporized acid burn their skin and lungs
or suffocate and kill them. 80 At the Channel Biorefinery &
Terminals, “some 80,000 gallons of methanol spilled from a tank
rupture into Greens Bayou, which enters the ship channel just
downstream of the Magellan terminal. Highly flammable and
explosive, methanol can cause brain lesions and other disorders.”81
Many other notable chemical releases occurred in and around
Houston during Harvey. Royal Dutch Shell PLC’s Deer Park
complex on the ship channel’s south bank released more than 3,000
pounds of benzene and the company initially reported a 1,000pound release of phenol, “which can burn skin and be potentially

78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Toxic Impact, supra note 60.
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fatal . . . .”82 The Chevron Phillips Chemical Company plant in
Baytown released “[a]bout 34,000 pounds of sodium hydroxide, or
lye, which can cause severe chemical burns, and unpermitted
airborne emissions, including 28,000 pounds of benzene . . . .”83
One of the worst hit chemical plants during Hurricane Harvey
was the Arkema chemical plant, about twenty miles northeast of
Houston,84 which is considered one of the most hazardous plants in
Texas.85 Harvey’s rains inundated the plant, causing it to lose
power, which in turn led to a loss of refrigeration.86
The plant manufactures organic peroxides commonly used in
everyday products like kitchen countertops, industrial paints,
polystyrene cups and plates, and PVC piping. The materials must
be kept very cool, otherwise there is “the potential for a chemical
reaction leading to a fire and/or explosion within the site
confines,” Arkema said.87

Arkema itself reported the sequence of events as follows:
The plant made extensive preparations prior to Hurricane
Harvey. We have backup generators at the site solely for the
purpose of being a redundant power supply for refrigeration
necessary for the safe storage of products. We also brought in
diesel powered refrigerated tank trailers and additional fuel as a
further redundancy. Employees safely shut down all operations
on Friday, August 25, prior to the hurricane’s landfall. We left a
small “ride-out” crew on site to address situations that could arise
at the site during the storm to protect the safety and security of
the community. The site lost primary power early Sunday
morning August 27.
The additional back-up generators
subsequently were inundated by water and failed. On Monday,
August 28 temperature sensitive products were transferred into 8
diesel-powered refrigerated containers where they currently
reside. We evacuated the ride-out crew on Tuesday, August 29 for
their safety. As of August 30, most of the refrigeration units have
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Julia Bagg et al., Crosby, Texas, Chemical Plant Explodes Twice, Arkema
Group Says, NBC NEWS (Aug. 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/GMA8-W33F.
85. Julie Turkewitz et al., New Hazard in Storm Zone: Chemical Blasts and
‘Noxious’ Smoke, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/Q8T8-5XU8.
86. Id.
87. Bagg et al., supra note 84.
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failed due to flooding. The site itself is now completely flooded and
inaccessible except by boat. In conjunction with the Department
of Homeland Security and the State of Texas, Arkema has set up
a command post in an off-site location near the plant.88

“With the power out and cooling systems failing, volatile organic
peroxides exploded multiple times over the course of a week,
producing towering pillars of fire and thick plumes of black
smoke.”89 In all, “[m]ore than 200 residents had to evacuate
because of the chemical fumes and noxious smoke caused by [the
fire], and 21 people sought medical attention.”90 In particular, “15
public safety officers were treated at a hospital after inhaling
smoke from chemical fires that followed the explosions.” 91 These
“sickened first responders” later filed suit, “as have Harris and
Liberty counties, which claim the company violated numerous
environmental and safety regulations.” 92
4. Houston’s Post-Harvey Toxic Exposure
Houston residents were aware of at least some of the toxic
releases around them during Harvey itself: “From Aug. 24 to Sept.
3, callers made 96 reports of oil, chemical or sewage spills across
southeast Texas.”93 As of March 2018, however, “reporters
catalogued more than 100 Harvey-related toxic releases — on land,
in water and in the air. Most were never publicized, and in the case
of two of the biggest ones, the extent or potential toxicity of the
releases was initially understated.” 94 Notably, many of the
companies who owned the sites where spills occurred had violated
environmental laws in their management of those sites in the
past.95
88. Frequently Asked Questions Answered, ARKEMA INC.,
https://perma.cc/6AHX-9EZH.
89. Alex Stuckey, Arkema Officials Were Warned of Flood Risks a Year Before
Hurricane Harvey, HOUS. CHRON. (May 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/73ZY-8UD9.
90. Stephanie Ebbs, Noxious Chemical Fire During Hurricane Harvey
Caused by Failure of ‘all levels of protection,’ Probe Reveals, ABC NEWS (May 25,
2018), https://perma.cc/FG2G-4Z5F.
91. Turkewitz et al., supra note 85.
92. Toxic Impact, supra note 60.
93. Griggs et al., supra note 56.
94. Toxic Impact, supra note 60.
95. Id.
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Perhaps most novel was the air pollution problems that
Harvey generated: “from Aug. 23 to Aug. 30, 46 facilities in 13
counties reported an estimated 4.6 million pounds of airborne
emissions that exceeded state limits, an analysis by the
Environmental Defense Fund, Air Alliance Houston and Public
Citizen shows.”96 Air pollution issues continued after the storm as
plants that had shut down for the storm released unusual amounts
of pollutants in restarting. For example, “[a] giant plastics plant in
Point Comfort, about 100 miles southwest of Houston, released
about 1.3 million pounds of excess emissions, including toxic gases
like benzene, when it restarted after the storm.” 97
Clearly, acute toxic exposures occurred during and
immediately after the hurricane. For example, in early September,
Houston recorded “a high benzene level of 324 parts per billion—
more than three times the level at which federal worker safety
guidelines recommend special breathing equipment.”98 Around the
San Jacinto Waste Pits, “[p]reliminary data from the EPA
indicated that in sediment samples taken around the site, dioxins
levels spiked 2,300 times above acceptable levels.” 99
However, because investigations remain incomplete, the
longer-term toxic legacy that Harvey gifted to Houston residents is
less clear. “Texas regulators say they have investigated 89
incidents, but have yet to announce any enforcement actions.” 100
Nevertheless, government monitoring of residual toxicity in
Houston has been limited compared to what occurred after
previous hurricanes, such as Ike (2008) and Katrina (2005). 101
Academic testing and studies suggest that the storm essentially
washed out the city’s topsoil, leaving relatively few sites with
worrisome levels of petroleum-related toxins.102 Nevertheless,
while residents were initially told that the releases posed no threat

96. Griggs et al., supra note 56.
97. Id.
98. Toxic Impact, supra note 60; see also Griggs et al., supra note 56.
99. Michael D. Regan, Health Concerns Swirl in Texas Months after Floods
from Harvey Spread Toxic Waste, PBS NEWS HOUR (Dec. 10, 2017),
https://perma.cc/93SV-ZKV9.
100. Toxic Impact, supra note 60.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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to human health, as of March 2018, the EPA continued to worry
about local toxic “hotspots” and the risks that they pose. 103
C. The Long-Term Threat of Toxic Sea-Level Rise
While hurricanes like Harvey dramatize coastal toxicity and
its public health risks for coastal inhabitants, sea-level rise (and
the increased storm surge that comes with it) present coastal
planners with a far more insidious toxicity problem. First, rising
seas make coastal storm events worse; indeed, the exacerbation of
storm surge is the most immediate and significant consequence of
sea-level rise. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (“IPCC”), “it is likely that extreme sea levels (for
example, as experienced in storm surges) have increased since
1970, being mainly the result of mean sea level rise.” 104
Second, in many parts of the United States—notably the Gulf
Coast—sea-level rise will cause the ocean to progressively
inundate and saturate existing toxic infrastructure, potentially
condemning emerging coastal communities and ecosystems to a
toxic existence. According to the IPCC, global mean sea level rose
by 0.19 meters over the period 1901 to 2010, and “[t]he rate of sea
level rise since the mid-19th century has been larger than the
mean rate during the previous two millennia.” 105 The IPCC also
concluded that the mean rate of global average sea level rise for
the period from 1993 to 2010 was nearly twice what occurred from
1901 to 2010.106
Sea level rise has two main components: melting land-based
ice (glaciers and ice shelves) and expanding volume as the ocean
warms.107 Although the two contributors have been roughly equal
until recently, melting ice and disintegrating ice shelves have
become significantly more important.108 Sea level rise will continue
103. Id.
104. 2014 IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 19, at 53.
105. Id. at 4.
106. Id. at 42.
107. Id.
108. Mark F. Meier et al., Glaciers Dominate Eustatic Sea-Level Rise in the
21st Century, 317 SCIENCE 1064, 1065 (2007) (arguing that glaciers and ice caps
“contribute about 60% of the eustatic, new-water component of sea-level rise [].”);
ANTARCTIC CLIMATE & ECOSYSTEMS COOPERATIVE RESEARCH CENTRE, ACE CRC
REPORT CARD: SEA LEVEL RISE 2012 4, 10 (2012), https://perma.cc/294T-QHW3
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to accelerate through the 21st century and beyond, affecting a
projected 95 percent of the ocean area and approximately 70
percent of coastlines worldwide. 109 However, sea level rise will not
be uniform across regions. For example, “[s]ince 1993, the regional
rates for the Western Pacific are up to three times larger than the
global mean, while those for much of the Eastern Pacific are near
zero or negative.”110
The future of the planet’s ice presents a worrisome
uncertainty, and the increasing pace of polar ice melt has added
significant volatility to the art of sea level rise prediction. 111
Studies repeatedly indicate that the Greenland ice sheet and
Antarctic ice are melting faster than expected, 112 and the IPCC
noted in 2014 that the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets were
losing mass, likely at an increasing rate. 113 It also noted that
glaciers around the world have continued to shrink and projected
that these glaciers, as well as other ice sheets besides Greenland
and Antarctica, will continue to decrease throughout the 21st
century, shrinking 15 percent to 85 percent by 2100.114 The IPCC
concluded that knowledge concerning “[a]brupt and irreversible ice
loss from the Antarctic ice sheet . . . is insufficient to make a
quantitative assessment” of its likelihood. 115 However, the West
Antarctic Ice Sheet contains enough ice to raise sea level by five to
seven meters (17 to 23 feet).116 If all of Antarctica melts, sea level
will rise approximately 60 meters or almost 200 feet.117 If both

(noting that while “[t]his present sea-level rise is due to a combination of thermal
expansion of a warming ocean and the melting of glaciers and ice sheets,” “[o]ver
the last decade, the contribution to sea-level rise from melting ice has exceeded
that due to thermal expansion of the ocean.”).
109. 2014 IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 19, at 13.
110. Id. at 42.
111. Anny Cazenave, How Fast Are the Ice Sheets Melting?, 314 SCIENCE
1250, 1251 (2006).
112. Id.; J.L. Chen et al., Satellite Gravity Measurements Confirm
Accelerated Melting of Greenland Ice Sheet, 313 SCIENCE 1958, 1958 (2006),
https://perma.cc/PTB8-L3Q6.
113. 2014 IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 19, at 4.
114. Id. at 12.
115. Id. at 16.
116. Vivien Gornitz, Sea Level Rise, After the Ice Melted and Today, NAT’L
AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMIN. (Jan. 2007), https://perma.cc/YG34-WAJ6.
117. Antarctic and S. Ocean Coal., The Antarctic and Climate Change, at 3,
ASOC IP 62, (2006), https://perma.cc/D4X2-52T8.
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Greenland and Antarctica melt completely, sea level would rise
about 65 meters or approximately 215 feet. 118
Regardless of which of these ice-melt calamities occur and
when, sea-level rise will continue throughout the 21st century,119
although its exact impact will vary considerably among coastal
regions. For example, the U.S. Global Change Research Program
(the “Program”) has noted that the southeastern region of the
United States, which includes the Gulf Coast, is particularly at
risk from sea-level rise, while the Northeast’s threats arise more
from coastal flooding as a result of increased precipitation and
coastal storms.120 In the Southeast:
Global sea level rose about eight inches in the last century and is
projected to rise another 1 to 4 feet in this century. Large
numbers of southeastern cities, roads, railways, ports, airports,
oil and gas facilities, and water supplies are vulnerable to the
impacts of sea level rise. Major cities like New Orleans, with
roughly half of its population below sea level, Miami, Tampa,
Charleston, and Virginia Beach are among those most at risk.
As a result of current sea level rise, the coastline of Puerto Rico
around Rincòn is being eroded at a rate of 3.3 feet per year.
Puerto Rico has one of the highest population densities in the
world, with 56% of the population living in coastal
municipalities.121

As the Program is quick to point out, the economic
consequences of sea-level rise in the Southeast could be
considerable. As one example, “Louisiana State Highway 1, heavily
used for delivering critical oil and gas resources from Port
Fourchon, is sinking, at the same time sea level is rising, resulting
in more frequent and more severe flooding during high tides and
storms. A 90-day shutdown of this road would cost the nation an

118. Cazenave, supra note 111, at 1250.
119. 2014 IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 19, at 58.
120. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN
THE UNITED STATES: HIGHLIGHTS 70–73 (2014), https://perma.cc/9ATX-CR9X
[hereinafter USGCRP CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT].
121. Id. at 73.
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estimated $7.8 billion.”122 The Program does not mention, however,
the implications for toxic exposures.
Along the Pacific coast, in California, “[s]ea level has risen
approximately 7 inches from 1900 to 2005, and is expected to rise
at growing rates in this century.”123 Sea-level rise exacerbates
existing flooding and erosion problems in California, particularly
during coastal storms and extreme high tides, and projections are
for increasing damage.124 In the Pacific Northwest, “the effects of
sea level rise, erosion, inundation, threats to infrastructure and
habitat, and increasing ocean acidity collectively pose a major
threat to the region.”125 The damage to critical coastal
infrastructure could be considerable:
The region’s populous coastal cities face rising sea levels, extreme
high tides, and storm surges, which pose particular risks to
highways, bridges, power plants, and sewage treatment plants.
Climate-related challenges also increase risks to critical port
cities, which handle half of the nation’s incoming shipping
containers.126

Notably, as discussed above, much of this infrastructure—sewage
treatment plants, power plants, urban runoff from highways and
ports—is also a source of toxicity.
Thus, even in government reports that acknowledge climate
change and describe its projected impacts on U.S. coastal
communities in detail, little attention is paid to the existing and
potential risks from toxics in the coastal zone. Dealing with this
toxic load, however, should be added to climate change adaptation
efforts in this country. As part of that effort, the next Part reviews
existing laws particularly relevant to reducing the toxic load along
the nation’s coasts.

122. Id. at 73, 90 (discussing the potential for economic disruption in the
nation’s coastal regions).
123. Id. at 92.
124. Id. at 78.
125. Id. at 80.
126. Id. at 78.
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EXISTING FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS
RELEVANT TO COASTAL TOXICITY

A. Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”)
As noted, Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to promote the
cleanup of existing toxic sites. In that sense, CERCLA is best
characterized as retrospective environmental law (i.e., providing
for cleanup liability after a hazardous release has already
occurred) rather than proactive or preventive. Nevertheless,
CERCLA and its state analogs remain important legal vehicles for
promoting the cleanup of existing toxic sites along the coast.
CERCLA is triggered by the release—past or present—of
hazardous substances from a facility.127 Because CERCLA was one
of the last major federal environmental statutes that Congress
enacted, it defines “hazardous substances” by referencing earlier
legislation—toxic pollutants under the Clean Water Act,
hazardous wastes under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, hazardous air pollutants under the Clean Air Act, and
imminently hazardous chemicals under the Toxic Substance
Control Act.128 However, the EPA can also designate additional
“hazardous substances” particularly for CERCLA.129
The EPA also designates “reportable quantities” of hazardous
substances.130 In order to facilitate effective responses to new
releases of hazardous substances, CERCLA requires “[a]ny person
in charge of a vessel or an onshore or offshore facility” to
immediately report releases of hazardous substances in excess of
the relevant reportable quantities to the National Response Center
as soon as that person knows of the release. 131 CERCLA defines
“release” broadly to include “any spilling, leaking, pumping,
pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping,
leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment,” except for
the many kinds of “releases” that are regulated under other

127. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (West 2018).
128. Id. § 9601(14) (defining “hazardous substance” by cross-referencing
these statutes).
129. See id. §§ 9601(14)(B), 9602(a).
130. Id. § 9602(a).
131. Id. § 9603(a).
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statutes.132 Thus, pesticide applications regulated under the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) and
pollutant discharges regulated under the Clean Water Act are
exempt from CERCLA’s reporting requirement.133 Otherwise,
failures to report releases of hazardous substances and false
reports are subject to criminal penalties.134
Section 104 of CERCLA authorizes the President of the United
States—who has since delegated this authority to the EPA—to
respond to releases of hazardous substances through removal and
remedial actions.135 Removal actions are the government’s
immediate response to a spill or release, designed primarily to
contain the hazardous substances and limit the threat to the
public.136 Remedial actions, in contrast, are “actions consistent
with permanent remedy . . . .”137 Both such cleanup actions must
be consistent with the National Contingency Plan, 138 which
establishes “procedures and standards for responding to releases
of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants . . . .”139
Alternatively, the EPA can order abatement actions under
section 106 of CERCLA. 140 As a practical matter, the primary
difference between a section 104 cleanup and a section 106 cleanup
is that under section 104, governments perform the cleanup and
seek reimbursement, while under section 106, potentially
responsible parties (“PRPs”) perform (and generally pay for) the
cleanup themselves, subject to federal and/or state supervision.141
The EPA must notify the affected state before ordering a section
106 abatement action 142 and “shall promulgate regulations
providing for substantial and meaningful involvement by each
State in initiation, development, and selection of remedial actions

132. Id. § 9601(22).
133. Id. § 9603(e).
134. Id. § 9603(b).
135. Id. § 9604(a)(1).
136. See id. § 9601(23) (defining “remove” and “removal”).
137. See id. § 9601(24) (defining “remedy” and “remedial action”).
138. Id. § 9604(a)(1).
139. Id. § 9605(a).
140. Id. § 9606(c).
141. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 161 (2004) (citing
Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 814 (1994)).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
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to be undertaken in that State.” 143 The affected state also has a
right to concur (or not) in the federal government’s selection of
certain remedial actions and a right to intervene in or bring a
relevant action if the state objects to the remedy that the federal
government chooses.144
Section 107 is the heart of CERCLA’s liability scheme. First,
section 107 identifies four categories of PRPs:
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility;
any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous
substance owned or operated any facility at which such
hazardous substances were disposed of;
any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise
arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a
transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person,
by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration
vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and
containing such hazardous substances; and
any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substance for transport to disposal or treatment facilities,
incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from
which there is a release, or a threatened release which
causes the incurrence of response costs . . . .145

These PRPs become liable for four kinds of costs and damages:
(A)

(B)
(C)

all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe
not inconsistent with the national contingency plan
[response costs];
any other necessary costs of response incurred by any
other person consistent with the national contingency
plan;
damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural
resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such
injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release
[natural resources damages]; and

143. Id. § 9621(f)(1).
144. Id. § 9621(f)(2)(B).
145. Id. § 9607(a)(1)–(4).
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the costs of any health assessment or health effects study
[required under section 104].146

Finally, section 107 provides PRPs with only three defenses:
(1) if the release and resulting damages were caused solely by “an
act of God”; (2) if the release and resulting damages were caused
solely by “an act of war”; or (3) if the release and resulting damages
were caused solely by “an act or omission of a third party other
than an employee or agent” of the PRP, and with no contractual
relationship with the PRP, if the PRP exercised “due care” and
“took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such
third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result
from such acts or omissions . . . .”147 Otherwise, PRPs can pursue a
variety of settlement options with the governments148 and
contribution actions against each other. 149
CERCLA’s basic goal is thus to have the people or companies
who created a contaminated site pay to clean it up. However,
Congress also created a Hazardous Substance Superfund,150
funded through a tax on chemical and oil companies, to pay for the
cleanup of “orphan” sites.151 This tax “expired in 1995, and it has
not been reinstated,152 with the result that Congress has been
appropriating money to the Superfund through the normal federal
budget process.
While CERCLA remains an important legal aspect of
promoting coastal cleanups, contamination removal under its
auspices has been notoriously slow in many circumstances, and
nothing in the act requires governments to prioritize sites by
location (say, in the coastal zone). The San Jacinto Waste Pits that
flooded during Hurricane Harvey provide an apt example. As
146. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A)–(D).
147. Id. § 9607(b).
148. Id. § 9622.
149. Id. § 9613(f)(1).
150. Id. § 9611.
151. “Orphan” sites are those for which no financially viable PRPs can be
found. See Summary of the Conmprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation,
and
Liability
Act,
U.S.
ENVTL.
PROT.
AGENCY,
https://perma.cc/9NQG-TP4C.
152. NAT’L PUB. RADIO (NPR), As Tax Expires, EPA Struggles To Clean Up
Superfund Sites (Aug. 6, 2010), https://perma.cc/7V6C-WYU9; Bryan Anderson,
Taxpayer dollars fund most oversight and cleanup costs at Superfund sites, WASH.
POST (Sept. 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/Z2NN-HP7K.
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noted, the site first became contaminated in the 1960s, and it has
long been known for its toxicity. For example, “the Texas Parks
and Wildlife Department warns people should not eat fish and
crabs from the area because the animals may be contaminated,”
and the EPA added the site to the CERCLA NPL in 2008. 153 After
Harvey, then-EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt put the San Jacinto
Waste Pits on a list of special sites deserving of his personal
attention, the EPA announced a $115 million plan to remove
contaminated material from the site, and a court approved an
agreement whereby two companies would come up with a plan to
clean up the site.154 However, in April 2018, Pruitt removed the
San Jacinto Waste Pits from his special list, leaving the companies
with twenty-nine months—more than two years—to formulate
their cleanup plan. 155 Cleanup at the site, even after Harvey, is
expected to take more than four years.156
B. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”)
Congress enacted the Solid Waste Disposal Act (“SWDA”)157 in
1976, but after the 1980 amendments it has become much more
commonly known as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(“RCRA”). Unlike CERCLA, RCRA is proactive, seeking to prevent
new contamination from hazardous waste. Specifically, Congress
found that “although land is too valuable a national resource to be
needlessly polluted by discarded materials, most solid waste is
disposed of on land in open dumps and sanitary landfills” and that
“disposal of solid waste and hazardous waste in or on the land
without careful planning and management can present a danger to
human health and the environment . . .”158
RCRA applies to “solid waste,” which the statute defines as:
any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water
supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other
discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or
contained gaseous material resulting from industrial,
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Hersher, supra note 61.
Id; see also Regan, supra note 99 (reporting the same figures).
Hersher, supra note 61.
Regan, supra note 99.
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k.
Id. §§ 6901(b)(1)–(2).
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commercial, mining, and agricultural operations, and from
community activities, but does not include solid or dissolved
material in domestic sewage, or solid or dissolved materials in
irrigation return flows or industrial sources which are point
sources subject to permits under section 1342 of Title 33 [the
Clean Water Act], or source, special nuclear, or byproduct
material as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended . . . .159

From there, RCRA regulation depends on whether solid waste is
hazardous or not.
Nonhazardous solid waste is subject to RCRA Subtitle D.
Under these provisions, states received the primary authority to
regulate non-hazardous solid waste. First, they were expected to
enact state solid waste management plans. 160 In order to receive
federal approval, these state plans had to meet six statutory
requirements.161 Most importantly, states had to forbid new open
dumps within their borders and provide for the closing or
upgrading of all existing open dumps. 162 As part of these controls,
states were expected to implement permit programs for solid waste
management facilities to control their intake of hazardous
waste.163 In addition, new disposal could only occur at sanitary
landfills.164 Under Congress’s requirements, all new, replacement,
and expanded landfills had to be built with at least two liners and
leachate collection systems and had to provide for groundwater
monitoring.165
RCRA regulation, however, focuses far more stringently on
hazardous waste, which is regulated under Subtitle C. A
“hazardous waste” is “a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes,
which because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical,
or infectious characteristics may—

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. § 6903(27).
Id. § 6943(a)(1).
Id. § 6943(a).
Id. § 6943(a)(2)–(3).
Id. § 6945(c)(1)(A).
Id. § 6944(b).
Id. § 6924(o)(1)(A)(i)–(ii).
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cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in
mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or
incapacitating reversible, illness; or
pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human
health or the environment when improperly treated,
stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise
managed.166

The EPA had the responsibility to “develop and promulgate
criteria for identifying the characteristics of hazardous waste, and
for listing hazardous waste[,]” and to actually list hazardous
wastes subject to RCRA’s Subtitle C requirements, “taking into
account toxicity, persistence, and degradability in nature,
potential for accumulation in tissue, and other related factors such
as
flammability,
corrosiveness,
and
other
hazardous
167
characteristics.”
It identified characteristics that made wastes
hazardous—ignitability,168 corrosiveness,169 reactivity,170 and
toxicity171—but also listed specific types of hazardous wastes from
various types of industries and industrial processes. 172
Subtitle C seeks to regulate hazardous wastes from “cradle to
grave”—that is, from initial creation to eventual (safe) disposal.
Hazardous waste generation is “the act or process of producing
hazardous waste.”173 Hazardous waste generators must keep
records that identify the hazardous wastes that they generate,
label those wastes properly, store the waste in appropriate
containers, begin RCRA’s manifest system to track the waste, and
provide information and reports about the waste.174 Hazardous
waste transporters, in turn, must keep records about the waste
they transport, continue the manifest system, refuse to transport
improperly labeled hazardous waste, and deliver the waste only to
permitted treatment, storage, and disposal (“TSD”) facilities.175

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. § 6903(5).
Id. § 6921(a).
40 C.F.R. § 261.21 (2018).
Id. § 261.22.
Id. § 261.23.
Id. § 261.24.
Id. §§ 261.31–.33
42 U.S.C.A. § 6903(6).
Id. § 6922(a).
Id. § 6923(a).
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RCRA rigorously regulates these TSD facilities, requiring
permitting,
financial
responsibility,
contingency
plans,
recordkeeping, and strict compliance with storage, handling, and
disposal requirements.176 In addition, as noted above, TSD
facilities become liable for corrective actions—that is, for cleanups
at and beyond the TSD facility if hazardous wastes escape. 177
Several facilities located in and near Houston during
Hurricane Harvey were regulated under Subtitle C. For example,
the Arkema Chemical Plant in Crosby, Texas that caught fire was
regulated as a RCRA large quantity hazardous waste generator
under the Handler ID TXD043750512. 178 Until 2011, the plant
shipped all of its wastes off-site, but by 2013, it was generating
over 16,000 tons of hazardous waste and handling most of that
waste on-site.179 It produces a variety of hazardous wastes,
including toxic metals (arsenic, cadmium, chromium, lead,
mercury, selenium, and silver), toxic benzene, and toxic
tetracholoroethylene, among several others.180 Nevertheless, until
Harvey, the chemical plant was relatively compliant with RCRA;
the State of Texas had taken only two informal (letter-based)
enforcement actions under RCRA against the plant, although the
facility had not been inspected since October 2013.181
C. Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”)
The federal Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”)182
essentially bribes coastal states with federal consistency
requirements, money, and technical assistance into engaging in
proactive coastal planning and management. 183 Specifically, the
Act encourages states to create Coastal Zone Management
Programs that meet 16 detailed requirements, 184 most of which are

176. Id. § 6924(a).
177. Id. § 6924(v).
178. RCRA Info Facility Information – Arkema Crosby Plant, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, https://perma.cc/U2TZ-DC6C.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Detailed Facility Report – Arkema Crosby Plant, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, https://perma.cc/8PTT-HZNG.
182. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451–1466 (West 2018).
183. See id. §§ 1455–56.
184. Id. § 1455(d).
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easily classified as land (and sometimes water) use planning185 or
governmental organization, authority, and procedures.186 A few
requirements are fairly specific; for example, coastal states must
address energy facilities in the coastal zone (including their
impacts),187 coastal erosion,188 and nonpoint source pollution.189
The delineated components of a Coastal Zone Management
Program are certainly broad enough to allow a state to prioritize
coastal toxicity.190 However, nothing in the Act explicitly mentions
toxics, toxicity, or hazardous waste.
Like all coastal states except Alaska, Texas implements an
approved Coastal Zone Management Program, which it first
adopted in 1997.191 The state’s goals for its program center around
Coastal Natural Resource Areas (“CNRAs”). Those goals are:
•
•
•
•

•

To protect, preserve, restore, and enhance the diversity,
quality, quantity, functions, and values of CNRAs;
To ensure sound management of all coastal resources by
allowing for compatible economic development and
multiple human uses of the coastal zone;
To minimize loss of human life and property due to the
impairment and loss of protective features of CNRAs;
To ensure and enhance planned public access to and
enjoyment of the coastal zone in a manner that is
compatible with private property rights and other uses of
the coastal zone;
To balance the benefits from economic development and
multiple human uses of the coastal zone, the benefits from
protecting, preserving, restoring, and enhancing CNRAs,
the benefits from minimizing loss of human life and
property, and the benefits from public access to and
enjoyment of the coastal zone;

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. § 1455(d)(2), (9), (11), (12), (13).
Id. § 1455(d)(3)–(7), (10), (14)–(16).
Id. §§ 1455(d)(2)(H), (8).
Id. § 1455(d)(2)(I).
Id. §§ 1455(d)(16), 1455b.
See id. §§ 1456b(a)(2), (4)–(6).
TEX. GEN. LAND OFFICE, TEXAS COASTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM: 2015-16
BIENNIAL REPORT -2 (2016) https://perma.cc/2CBF-FQ3D.
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To coordinate agency and subdivision decision-making
affecting CNRAs by establishing clear, objective policies
for the management of CNRAs;
To make agency and subdivision decision-making
affecting CNRAs efficient by identifying and addressing
duplication and conflicts among local, state, and federal
regulatory and other programs for the management of
CNRAs;
To make agency and subdivision decision-making
affecting CNRAs more effective by employing the most
comprehensive, accurate, and reliable information and
scientific data available and by developing, distributing
for public comment, and maintaining a coordinated,
publicly accessible geographic information system (“GIS”)
of maps of the coastal zone and CNRAs at the earliest
possible date;
To make coastal management processes visible, coherent,
accessible, and accountable to the people of Texas by
providing for public participation in the ongoing
development and implementation of the CMP; and
To educate the public about the principal coastal problems
of state concern and technology available for the
protection and improved management of CNRAs. 192

In addition, however, Texas is pursuing a coastal resiliency
program, with public meetings focused on “increasing economic
and environmental vulnerabilities, resulting from population
growth, increased storm intensity, and shoreline erosion” and on
“planning for changing conditions and future storm hazards along
the coast.”193 In addition, the Program “is developing the Master
Plan, a long-term framework intended to mitigate damage from
future coastal natural disasters and preserve and enhance the
state’s coastal natural resources and assets.” 194 Nevertheless,
although coastal infrastructure is clearly part of these discussions
and resiliency planning, none of the identified strategies—“1)
restoring Texas’s beaches and dunes; 2) bay shoreline stabilization
192. Id. at 3.
193. Id. at 10.
194. Id.
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and estuarine wetland restoration (living shorelines); 3) stabilizing
the GIWW; 4) freshwater wetland and coastal uplands
conservation; 5) delta and lagoon restoration; 6) oyster reef
creation and restoration; 7) rookery island creation and
restoration; and 8) plans, policies, and programs”195—acknowledge
coastal toxicity as a possible problem.
Toxicity consciousness may emerge in some parts of Texas at
a more local level. For example, using grants from the Coastal Zone
Management Program, Galveston Bay engaged both in a
contaminated seafood warning program to educate subsistence and
recreational fishers, especially in low-income and Spanishspeaking immigrant communities, “about the risk of consuming
seafood contaminated with toxic substances” and a program to
educate boaters about their wastes—most recently, the illegality of
sewage discharges but with additional issues slated for future
years.196 These developments thus suggest that Galveston might
be one of the Texas coastal municipalities that is most open to
dealing more proactively with coastal toxicity problems.
D. State and Local Land Use Planning
Unlike environmental and natural resource regulation, land
use planning is usually the particular province of municipalities,
and this aspect of local law can be critical to dealing with climate
change and its impacts. C40, “a network of the world’s megacities
committed to addressing climate change,”197 has underscored the
importance of land use planning as follows:
Land use planning provides the strategic framework for the
growth of a city, determining the physical uses of space that will
influence how people live and move, for generations to come.
Cities have significant authority over land use policies and
regulations. . . . It is particularly important that cities have a
good plan for how they will address growth, because as C40

195. Id.
196. Id. at 16, 18, 22, 26.
197. About C40, C40 CITIES, https://perma.cc/RGC3-H4CC.
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research has shown, the planning decisions made today will have
a major impact on the carbon emissions of tomorrow.198

By this organization’s international count, “79% of cities have the
power to set land use policies and regulations and 81% are
responsible for carrying out the function of land use planning.”199
Land use planning is also relevant to latent and cumulative
toxicity concerns. Indeed, “[l]and use data are increasingly
understood as important indicators of potential environmental
health risk in urban areas where micro-scale or neighborhood level
hazard exposure data are not routinely collected.” 200 In 2003, a
National Academy of Public Administration panel reported to the
EPA that municipalities could use land use law more effectively to
reduce residents’ cumulative toxic exposures. Most directly, “local
planning and zoning authorities could be used to reduce adverse
impacts where industrial and residential areas are located near
each other.”201 Notably, however, the report also advocated greater
coordination and interaction between states and local governments
to best deploy land use planning tools. For example, it
recommended that states take steps to ensure local government
participation in environmental permitting decisions (such as
RCRA permitting decisions made through delegated federal
authority), because “[t]hrough active involvement, local
governments can help ensure that proposed environmental
permits contain the conditions necessary to protect public health
and the environment at the community level.”202 The report saw
great promise for such increased cooperation, concluding that “[i]f
state and local officials make creative and aggressive use of
existing legal authorities, it may be possible to resolve the
environmental and public health concerns of community
residents.”203
198. LAND
USE
PLANNING:
NETWORK
OVERVIEW,
C40
CITIES,
https://perma.cc/2ZCP-HPDT.
199. Id.
200. Jason Corburn, Urban Land Use, Air Toxics and Public Health:
Assessing Hazardous Exposures at the Neighborhood Scale, 27 ENVTL. IMPACT
ASSESSMENT REV. 145, 145 (2007).
201. NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., ADDRESSING COMMUNITY CONCERNS: HOW
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE RELATES TO LAND USE PLANNING AND ZONING 18 (2003),
https://perma.cc/6ELE-FBNL.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 19.
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Houston is infamous, however, for its lack of land use
planning: “The city of Houston proper is unique among large US
cities in that it has no traditional use-based zoning (ala-Sim City:
residential here, commercial there, etc.) . . . .”204 However, that
doesn’t mean that development is completely haphazard. The city
itself “regulates land use in many other ways, such as minimumparking requirements. Many neighborhoods have homeowners
associations and deed restrictions that limit what can be built. And
Houston’s suburbs largely do have zoning.”205
Notably, in the immediate wake of Harvey, both local and
national pundits debated the contribution of Houston’s land use
planning to the severity of the flooding, particularly in terms of
wetlands destruction and building in floodplains.206 Less
flamboyant were several pre-Harvey examinations of the
relationship between Houston area’s land use planning and
residents’ potential toxic exposure. For example, Houston passed a
hazardous materials ordinance in 1996 that prevents hazardous
facilities from locating in neighborhoods that are more than onethird residential.207 However, like most such laws, this ordinance
did not apply to hazardous facilities already in existence,
effectively allowing those existing facilities to continue.208

204. Daniel Herriges, Houston Isn’t Flooded Because of Its Land Use
Planning, STRONG TOWNS (Aug. 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/LK4Q-EAXP; see also
Nolan Gray, How Houston Regulates Land Use, MARKET URBANISM (Sept. 19,
2016), https://perma.cc/JLV9-QF45 (“Unlike every other major U.S. city, Houston
doesn’t mandate the separation of residential, commercial, and industrial
developments. This means that restaurants, homes, warehouses, and offices are
free to mix as the market allows. As many have pointed out, however, marketdriven separation of incompatible uses—think strip clubs and preschools—is
common in Houston.”).
205. Herriges, supra note 204.
206. Compare id., and Emily Hamilton, What Houston’s Critics Get Wrong:
Land-Use Regulations Weren’t to Blame for Hurricane Harvey’s Destruction, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 18, 2017), https://perma.cc/2SEU-977B, with Ana
Campoy & David Yanofsky, Houston’s Flooding Shows What Happens When You
Ignore Science and Let Developers Run Rampant, QUARTZ (Aug. 29, 2017),
https://perma.cc/KS2A-WU5D, and Shawn Boburg & Beth Reinhard, Houston’s
‘Wild West’ Growth: How the City’s Development May Have Contributed to
Devastating Flooding, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2017), https://perma.cc/9PUM-PP2G.
207. Lydia DePillis, How Zoning Impacts Your Proximity to Pollution: SixtyFive Percent of Houston is Within a Mile of a Toxic Emitter, HOUS. CHRON. (Sept.
20, 2016, 4:13 PM), https://perma.cc/ZL4G-VCM3.
208. Id.
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A team of economists from the University of Pittsburgh and
University of Washington, Bothell, happened to be assessing the
long-term effect of zoning in Chicago across Hurricane Harvey’s
timeframe, drafting their results in 2016 but publishing in May
2018.209 Because of Houston’s resistance to traditional zoning, it
served as the researchers’ control/counterfactual.210 Provocatively,
65 percent of Houston lies within one mile of a TRI reporting
facility, compared to 30 percent of Austin, 44 percent of Dallas, and
43 percent of San Antonio, “suggest[ing] that land use patterns in
relatively un-regulated Houston differ measurably from
comparable cities that experienced formal zoning.”211 In addition,
the researchers’ results for Chicago “strongly suggest that over the
long-run urban planning has been eﬀective in creating residential
neighborhoods that are distant from undesirable manufacturing
uses, and that houses in these neighborhoods are more valuable as
a result”212—a result the economists clearly view as desirable.
However, it should be noted that there is another way of
looking at the researchers’ results, which is that Houston’s
approach to land use has more fairly spread the city’s overall toxic
burden across its citizens. Notably, the researchers found that
areas zoned for manufacturing or commercial use in Chicago were
statistically more likely to contain TRI reporting facilities213—a
result that makes inherent intuitive sense. Such concentration of
toxics-emitting facilities, however, is also a primary source of
environmental justice concerns, as those who cannot afford the
more expensive neighborhoods are forced by economics to live with
additional toxic exposure and risk.
Regardless of how land use planning distributes toxic
exposures, such exposures remain public health risks. It is better
for all concerned to reduce the city’s overall toxic burden in the first
place. Houston’s 1996 hazardous facility ordinance was more akin
to Chicago’s separation-of-uses approach to land use planning than
to a real effort to reduce overall toxicity, but Part IV will discuss

209. See Allison Shertzer et al., Zoning and the Economic Geography of
Cities, 105 J. URBAN ECON. 20 (2018), https://perma.cc/8K8B-D49A.
210. Id. at 32.
211. Id. at 33.
212. Id. at 34.
213. Id. at 28.
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alternative approaches that better implement a toxicity reduction
goal.
E. Tort Law
Tort is the traditional remedy for preventable damage, and
four torts in particular are generally associated with releases of
toxic materials. Strict liability arises when a defendant engages in
inherently dangerous activities or abnormally dangerous
conduct.214 Unlike strict liability, negligence is a fault-based
approach to liability that requires a plaintiff to prove that the
defendant violated a duty or standard of care, factually and legally
causing the plaintiff harm. 215 Trespass applies to a defendant’s
physical invasion of the plaintiff’s real property, such as a physical
spilling of toxic materials onto the plaintiff’s land. 216 Finally,
nuisance allows a plaintiff to recover when a defendant
unreasonably interferes with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of
real property.217 “Public nuisance is an unreasonable interference
with rights held by the public in general,” while private nuisance
“is an unreasonable interference with the rights of a plaintiff who
has a possessory interest in the land affected.” 218 Like CERCLA,
however, tort liability is retrospective and reactive: the damage, in
almost all cases, has already occurred.
Hurricane Harvey gave rise to several follow-on lawsuits,
many demonstrating how injured plaintiffs can attempt to use tort
liability to seek compensation for their exposures to coastal
toxicity. The Arkema Chemical Plant in Crosby has become a
particularly cogent defendant as a result of the fires and other toxic
releases at the plant. In early September 2017, even as Harvey was
still winding down, “[s]even police, fire and emergency medical
technicians sued Arkema in Harris County District Court for at
least $1 million, alleging negligence by the company and
executives led flammable organic peroxides stored at the site to

214. ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
MATERIALS 32 (3rd ed. 2012).
215. Id. at 32–33.
216. Id. at 33.
217. Id.
218. Id.

IN

CONTEXT: CASES

AND

37

38

Pace Environmental Law Review

[Vol. 36

ignite after the plant lost power during the storm.” 219 Their
complaint, filed in the Harris County District Court,220 alleges that
the plaintiffs suffered vomiting and loss of breath while responding
to the Arkema fires and asserts causes of action for negligence,
gross negligence, and negligence per se.221
The next month, residents of Crosby, Texas filed a class action
lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, Houston Division, against Arkema, 222 alleging negligence,
trespass, nuisance, property damage, personal injury, failure to
warn, product liability, ultra-hazardous activity (strict liability),
gross negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.223
They seek punitive damages and are asking the court to pierce
Arkema’s corporate veil so that its parent corporations may also be
held liable.224 The plaintiffs base their complaints both on the fires
at the plant and on releases from two water tanks. They allege that
“an estimated 23,608 pounds of contaminants were released from
two [water] tanks including: ethylbenzene,mineral spirits, naptha,
naphthalene, organic peroxides, trimethylbenzene, tert-butyl
alcohol, 2,5 dimethyl-2,5 di(t-butylperoxy)hexane and t-amyl
alcohol.”225 In addition, according to the plaintiffs, the smoke and
ash from the fire released PAHs, toxic metals like antimony,
volatile organic compounds like acetone, dioxins, furans, and a host
of other toxic compounds.226
What is striking in both cases is not just the plaintiffs’
assertions of past injuries during the hurricane and its toxic
releases, but their fears for unknown future injuries. Thus, the
plaintiff first responders seek not only actual damages for pain
already suffered and medical care already received, but also

219. Reuters, First Responders File Suit Against Arkema Over ‘Serious
Bodily Injuries’ in Houston Chemical Plant Fire After Hurricane Harvey, CNBC
(Sept. 7, 2017, 11:22 PM), https://perma.cc/EWX8-UXGB.
220. See Complaint, Graves v. Arkema, No. 2017-58465 (333d Judicial Dist.
Ct., Harris County, Tex. Oct. 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/26LH-REZ3 [hereinafter
Graves Complaint].
221. Id. at 6, 7–9.
222. See Complaint, Wheeler v. Arkema, No. 4:17-cv-02960 (S.D. Tx. Oct. 2,
2017), https://perma.cc/7Z57-BKTQ [hereinafter Wheeler Complaint].
223. Id. ¶¶ 82–102.
224. Id. ¶¶ 104–11.
225. Id. ¶ 46.
226. Id. ¶ 59.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss1/1

38

2018]

Cleaning Up Our Toxic Coasts

39

“[r]easonable and necessary medical care and expenses which will
in all reasonable probability be incurred in the future;” “[p]hysical
pain and suffering in the future;” “[p]hysical impairment which, in
all reasonable probability, will be suffered in the future;” “[l]oss of
earning capacity which will, in all probability, be incurred in the
future;” “[d]isfigurement in the future;” “[m]ental anguish in the
future;” and “[t]he cost of future medical monitoring.”227 The
Crosby residents, similarly, seek “[a]n Order establishing a
Medical Monitoring Program designed to survey as appropriate
and to protect the Class Members from latent, dread disease,
funded by the Defendants . . .”228 These cases, therefore, frame the
Arkema flooding, fire, and releases as the source of true toxic torts,
plunging the plaintiffs legally into the uncertain world of “futures”
cases.229
Studies released in May 2018 suggest that the plaintiffs in
these cases may have good grounds for their lawsuits. 230 The U.S.
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board found that
officials at the Arkema chemical plant had been warned over one
year before Harvey that that plant was at risk of flooding, and it
concluded in its 154-page report that Arkema “was not prepared
for the 6 feet of water that wiped out the facility’s power and
backup generators.” 231 However, as the claims for medical
monitoring and future damages show, the latent toxicity around
Houston has morphed, because of Hurricane Harvey, into
psychologically real and legally cognizable worries for all of the
Arkema-exposed plaintiffs about their future health, with the true

227. Graves Complaint, supra note 220, at 13.
228. Wheeler Complaint, supra note 222, at 32.
229. One of the classic problems of toxic torts is the sometimes very long
latency period between exposure to a toxic agent and manifestation of a disease.
“Because of these issues, plaintiffs have increasingly sought recovery after
exposure but before the manifestation of disease has taken place. These ‘futures’
cases are among the most hotly debated in toxic tort law.” ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG ET
AL., TOXIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 668 (2011). Medical
monitoring is the least controversial of the three typical futures remedies, which
also include fear of disease and enhanced risk of disease. Id. at 668–711.
230. Ebbs, supra note 90.
231. Stuckey, supra note 89 (citing to U.S. CHEM. SAFETY AND HAZARD
INVESTIGATION BD., ORGANIC PEROXIDE DECOMPOSITION, RELEASE, AND FIRE AT
ARKEMA CROSBY FOLLOWING HURRICANE HARVEY FLOODING (2018),
https://perma.cc/ZLT8-AQ2G).
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future risks that they face from their exposures during Harvey
very unclear.
IV.

THREE SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING
A PRECAUTIONARY, HUMAN HEALTH-BASED
APPROACH TO IMPROVING COASTAL
ADAPTIVE CAPACITY IN THE
ANTHROPOCENE

It can almost always be said, in almost any context, that
governments could improve both their enforcement of
environmental and public health laws and their disaster
preparedness and response. Analyses of Hurricane Harvey in
Houston certainly support these common suggestions for
improving coastal responses to hurricanes.232 Nevertheless,
environmental enforcement and disaster response are largely
reactionary, rather than precautionary, responses to toxic coasts,
effectively focused less on protecting public health than on
supporting coastal industry until such industry causes real
problems.
Coastal states and municipalities can pursue more
precautionary, health-based management policies regarding toxics
in the coastal zone. Federal law almost always leaves states free to
pursue more stringent pollution policies than it requires, and new
technologies can help these governments to de-toxify their coastal
zones. This Part presents three truly precautionary suggestions
that serve to promote coastal public health by reducing the ability
of coastal storms and sea-level rise to produce toxic hazards during
flooding and inundation.

232. See generally Toxic Impact, supra note 60 (noting, for example, that
many spills were not reported to emergency responders during Harvey and that
many of the facilities involved had track records of environmental violations).
Notably, the Texas Legislature had actually hampered environmental
enforcement at the municipal level. “Two Texas laws enacted since mid-2015 have
weakened counties’ ability to police polluters. The first caps at $2.15 million what
they can collect from polluters in lawsuits. The rest must go to the state. The
second law took effect Sept. 1. It obliges counties to give the state right of first
refusal on any pollution enforcement cases, which local officials say could mean
less punitive action.” Id.
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A. Clean Up Existing Contaminated Sites
While, as Part III discussed, legal authorities exist at both the
federal and state levels to clean up existing toxic waste dumps and
other hazardous sites, such cleanups have not proceeded as fast as
they might, nor has coastal contamination been made a priority.
As a result, “[c]ontaminated sites often go for years and sometimes
decades without being fully cleaned up.”233
Finding sufficient funds for these often-expensive cleanups is
often part of the problem. As noted, the Superfund tax expired in
1995 and Congress has been funding CERCLA cleanups through
annual appropriations. In 2015, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (“GAO”) found that both the funding and the
effectiveness
of
CERCLA
were
declining,
sometimes
dramatically.234 Its more specific findings are worth quoting at
length:
Annual federal appropriations to the Environmental Protection
Agency’s (EPA) Superfund program generally declined from
about $2 billion to about $1.1 billion in constant 2013 dollars
from fiscal years 1999 through 2013. EPA expenditures—from
these federal appropriations—of site-specific cleanup funds on
remedial cleanup activities at nonfederal National Priorities List
(NPL) sites declined from about $0.7 billion to about $0.4 billion
during the same time period. . . . EPA spent the largest amount
of cleanup funds in Region 2 [comprising New Jersey, New York,
Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and eight tribal nations235],
which accounted for about 32 percent of cleanup funds spent at
nonfederal NPL sites during this 15-year period. The majority of
cleanup funds was spent in seven states, with the most funds
spent in New Jersey—over $2.0 billion in constant 2013 dollars,
or more than 25 percent of cleanup funds.
From fiscal years 1999 through 2013, the total number of
nonfederal sites on the NPL annually remained relatively
constant, while the number of remedial action project
233. Toxics Action Center, supra note 29, at 6.
234. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-812, Trends in Federal
Funding and Cleanup of EPA’s Nonfederal National Priorities List Sites 1 (2015),
https://perma.cc/VJQ3-NA7G [hereinafter Trends in Federal Funding].
“Nonfederal” sites are sites that are not federal facilities, i.e.- sites like military
bases that are owned by the federal government. Id.
235. EPA Region 2, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://perma.cc/6H8L-6JQ4.
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completions
and
construction
completions
generally
declined. . . . The total number of nonfederal sites on the NPL
increased from 1,054 in fiscal year 1999 to 1,158 in fiscal year
2013, and averaged about 1,100 annually. The number of
remedial action project completions at nonfederal NPL sites
generally declined by about 37 percent during the 15-year
period. Similarly, the number of construction completions at
nonfederal NPL sites generally declined by about 84 percent
during the same period.236

Perhaps surprisingly to many, despite President Trump’s
February 2018 overall proposal to slash the EPA’s budget, he
proposed to maintain CERCLA cleanup funding at $1.1 billion for
fiscal year 2019 and has proposed other mechanisms for funding
cleanups as part of his infrastructure package.237 While some of
these proposals, like giving CERCLA cleanups “access to financing
under the Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act
(“WIFIA”) lending program to address contamination to water
resources,” might simply shift existing money from other
environmental issues to cleanups, others would expand the grant
money available to cleanup both brownfields and NPL sites.238
In March 2018, Congress appropriated almost $1.1 billion to
the Superfund, although that money can also be transferred to
other federal agencies.239 It also directly provided $80 million in
state and tribal assistance grants under CERCLA,240 over $77
million to the National Institutes of Health for CERCLA-required
health studies,241 and over $74 million to the Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry for health risk assessments
under CERCLA.242 In addition, under the heading of
“Infrastructure,” Congress added another $63 million for the EPA’s
CERCLA activities, $650 million for the state and tribal grants
program, and $53 million to the EPA’s Water Infrastructure

236. Trends in Federal Funding, supra note 234.
237. Sylvia Carignan, Trump Proposes New Funding Options for Superfund,
Brownfields, BNA NEWS, https://perma.cc/KJ88-MQX9.
238. Id.
239. Consolidated Appropriations Act 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat.
348, 664 (2018).
240. Id. at 667.
241. Id. at 680.
242. Id.
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Finance and Innovation Program Account for loans. 243 Finally,
Congress enacted the Brownfields Utilization, Investment, and
Local Development (“BUILD”) Act of 2018 through the budget bill,
which, inter alia, increases the availability of grants and loans for
brownfield sites—but not those on the NPL.244
However, this is not enough money. Thus, there continue to be
calls to reinstate the Superfund tax,245 and there are also calls to
increase the EPA’s CERCLA enforcement financing, providing the
agency the ability to force the liable parties to pay for cleanups.246
Direct citizen actions offer an alternative approach. The
ultimate “fix” to coastal cleanups is altered public priorities that
can put sufficient pressure on politicians at all levels of
government to provide the funding and personnel necessary to
expedite de-toxifying actions. In the meantime, citizen lawsuits
can sometimes provide a second-best jump-start. Unlike most
federal environmental laws, however, CERCLA’s citizen suit
provision247 is of limited use to plaintiffs who are not themselves
liable under the Act to try to force actual cleanups, because: (1)
many of the damages that plaintiffs would seek are not “response
costs” recoverable under CERCLA;248 (2) individuals, NGOs, and
cities cannot seek natural resources damages; 249 and (3) CERCLA
includes a fairly stringent bar to any citizen suit that challenges
an ongoing cleanup, including suits seeking to strengthen that
effort.250 Nevertheless, RCRA’s citizen suit provision can often (but
not always) fill in, because it allows plaintiffs to bring suit “against
any person . . . who has contributed or is contributing to the past
or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or
disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an

243. Id. at 694.
244. Id. at 1055–59.
245. Bryan Anderson, Taxpayer Dollars Fund Most Oversight and Cleanup
Costs at Superfund Sites, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/6FL6QDA2 (quoting Christina Todd).
246. Elliott
Gilberg,
Funding
the
Superfund,
WASH.
POST,
https://perma.cc/2YKJ-FFYJ.
247. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9659.
248. See e.g., Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 413, 416–18 (M.D. Pa.
1989).
249. Id. at 418–19; see also City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc.,
833 F. Supp. 646, 652 (N.D. Oh. 1993).
250. 42 U.S.C.A § 9613(h).
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imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment . . . .”251 While litigation also requires money, RCRA
allows courts to award costs and attorney fees to successful
plaintiffs,252 and, like most federal environmental citizen suit
provisions, it preserves plaintiffs’ tort remedies. 253
Cities can also act to effectuate coastal cleanups. As one
example, the City of Emeryville, California, located between
Berkeley and Oakland on San Francisco Bay, was essentially one
large brownfield site.254 Specifically, “[a]s large industries began to
contract and relocate to other cities in the 1970s, they left behind
properties with toxins that had to be cleaned up before other
businesses could use them.” 255 To address these sites, the City
assembled state and federal grants both to clean up properties that
it owns and to make loans to private property owners for private
remediation.256 One of the city’s current projects will become a
greenway; another will be turned into affordable housing.257
B. Implement Toxic-Aware Land Use and Waste
Management Planning Along the Coast
While cleaning up legacy toxicity remains a significant
political challenge, coastal municipalities and states can take a
number of other measures to reduce the toxic load on the nation’s
coasts moving forward. One avenue is to revamp land use planning
to more directly address toxicity issues. The National Academy of
Public Administration panel, for example, made several
recommendations relevant to municipalities seeking to avoid
concentrations of toxic and hazardous facilities in particular areas.
First, such municipalities should “take steps to eliminate existing
nonconforming uses that present public health and environmental
hazards.”258 Second, “they should adopt more flexible zoning
techniques, such as:

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id. § 6972(a)(1)(B).
Id. § 6972(e).
Id. § 6972(f).
Brownfield Program, EMERYVILLE, CA, https://perma.cc/CX3D-TRE2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., supra note 201, at 19.
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• Setting up conditional uses that impose restrictions on
certain uses that may affect environmental justice issues;
• Establishing overlay zones that impose additional
requirements to provide for additional environmental
protections;
• Using performance zoning to regulate the adverse
impacts of nuisance-like activities, such as noise and odor;
and
• Establishing buffer zones in transitional areas between
incompatible land uses, especially for industrial uses
adjacent to residential areas.259
Overall, the panel concluded, “[l]ocal governments can play a
primary role in identifying neighborhoods where residents face
multiple environmental and public health risks. However, they
need help from the other levels of government to develop and
implement strategies for reducing risks, taking advantage of each
level’s unique authorities and expertise.” 260
The Toxics Action Center has also recommended toxicityreducing actions that states and municipalities can take. First,
states and municipalities can act to reduce or eliminate persistent
toxic chemicals in the coastal zone.261 Persistent toxic chemicals
are slow to break down and lose their toxicity, and “[t]hese
contaminants can cause cancer, birth defects and other
reproductive problems, immune system challenges and damage to
the nervous and respiratory systems.”262 Massachusetts, for
example, “passed the Toxics Use Reduction Act (TURA), creating a
highly successful system to assist industrial users of large
quantities of toxic chemicals to reduce their toxics use. This
program has been good for public health and also resulted in
significant cost savings for many participating businesses.” 263
Indeed, reports indicate that between 1990 and 1999, businesses
in Massachusetts reduced their chemical wastes by 57 percent,
reduced their use of toxic chemicals by 40 percent, reduced their
chemical emissions by 80 percent—and saved $15 million in the

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id.
Id. at 21.
Toxics Action Center, supra note 29, at 5.
Id.
Id.
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process.264 Other examples of such state statutes exist, including
Oregon’s 1989 Toxics Use and Hazardous Waste Reduction Act,265
which requires any large toxics user in the state to complete a
toxics use reduction and hazardous waste reduction plan that
identifies alternatives to its current practices.266
Second, relatedly, states and municipalities can work to
reduce specific uses of toxic materials, and hence residents’ direct
exposures. For example, in 2001 Massachusetts enacted the
Children and Families Protection Act267 “to reduce children’s
exposure to harmful pesticides by restricting pesticide use in
private and public schools and daycare centers and increasing
right-to-know. Unfortunately, the law has been implemented
unevenly across the state.”268
Third, coastal municipalities can work to reduce their overall
waste streams, working toward a goal of zero waste. For example,
Nantucket, Massachusetts “diverts more than 92% of waste from
landfills through aggressive recycling and waste reduction
practices and has extended the life of the landfill for decades.” 269
C. Enact Building Codes that Minimize the Potential
for Further Toxic Releases
Many industrial facilities in Houston essentially threw up
their hands in trying to prevent releases during Hurricane Harvey.
The on-site manager of Gulf Coast Energy, for example, declared
his facility’s release of methanol “‘impossible to contain’” in light of
the 20-foot floodwaters.270 Similarly, Arkema Chemicals resists
arguments that it failed to prepare its Crosby chemical plant
adequately, emphasizing that the flooding during Harvey was
“unprecedented.”271

264. Or. Ctr. for Envtl. Health et al., Presentation to League of Oregon
Cities: Sustainability Through Toxics Reduction in Local Government 12 (Sept.
29, 2007), https://perma.cc/92KU-VEUH.
265. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 465.003–.037 (2018).
266. Id. § 465.015.
267. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 132B, § 6C (2018).
268. Toxics Action Center, supra note 29, at 7.
269. Id. at 6.
270. Toxic Impact, supra note 60 (quoting Dennis Frost).
271. Ebbs, supra note 90.
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While lawyers, politicians, scientists, economists, and public
health officials can (and do) debate how much preparation is “too
much” in light of increasing risks to coastal communities from
climate change, coastal storms, sea-level rise, and storm surge, it
is worth noting that architects and building engineers having been
putting considerable effort into designing “storm-proof” homes and
businesses that could greatly reduce toxic contamination from
flooding. These efforts range from developing better building
materials, such as bendable glass and ultra-high performance
concrete,272 to architectural designs intended to deflect wave and
wind energy rather than merely withstand them.273 Some of these
are futuristic and rounded; others—like many of those designed for
Brad Pitt’s Make It Right Foundation to benefit victims of
Hurricane Katrina—simply modify traditional building shapes
and incorporate better materials. 274
How exactly buildings are constructed is often dictated by
building codes. Indeed, as one commentator noted, building codes
have already been important in reducing hurricane destruction:
Building codes are the baseline defense against hurricane
damage. Improved building codes in Florida (the most stringent
in the nation) after 1992’s Hurricane Andrew required installing
impact windows, using stronger ties between roofs and walls, and
securing roof shingles with nails instead of staples, according to
the Wall Street Journal. And indeed, newer buildings built to
code fared better during Hurricane Irma. 275

Coastal states and municipalities should thus consider these
new hurricane-proof designs when updating coastal building codes.
V.

CONCLUSION

Public health considerations are an important part of climate
change adaptation strategies. As the U.S. Global Change Research
Program recognized in 2014, “[p]ublic health actions, especially
272. Zach Mortice, Hurricane-Proof Construction Methods Can Prevent the
Destruction of Communities, REDSHIFT (Nov. 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/ZM6NU6X7.
273. See Amy Schellenbaum, 19 Examples of Stunning Hurricane-Resistant
Architecture, CURBED (Oct. 30, 2012, 1:15 PM), https://perma.cc/C33C-W42F.
274. See id.
275. Mortice, supra note 272.
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preparedness and prevention, can do much to protect people from
some of the impacts of climate change. Early action provides the
largest health benefits. As threats increase, our ability to adapt to
future changes may be limited.” 276
Coastal adaptation is a complex subject, but discussions about
retreat, armoring, and coastal water supplies often ignore or
sideline the ever-present issue of coastal toxicity. Coastal storms
like Hurricane Harvey, however, make this toxic potential obvious,
underscoring its status as both a continuing present threat to
public health and a future burden on changing coastlines,
migrating coastal communities, and evolving coastal ecosystems.
Therefore, a precautionary and health-based approach to coastal
climate change adaptation—at all of the federal, state, and local
levels—should explicitly and directly address the reduction of
coastal toxicity, better employing environmental law, land use
planning, toxicity prevention statutes and ordinances, and even
building codes to achieve this goal.

276. USGCRP CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT, supra note 120, at 34.
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